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Abstract 
We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer 
securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions.  First, investors 
(and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks.  Second, investors demand 
securities with safe cash flows.  Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs 
by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks.  Because the 
risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive.  As investors eventually recognize these 
risks, they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even 
without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive. 

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I. Introduction 
Many recent episodes of financial innovation share a common narrative.  It begins 
with a strong demand from investors for a particular, often safe, pattern of cash flows.  Some 
traditional securities available in the market offer this pattern, but investors demand more (so 
prices are high).  In response to demand, financial intermediaries create new securities 
offering the sought after pattern of cash flows, usually by carving them out of existing 
projects or other securities that are more risky.  By virtue of diversification, tranching, 
insurance, and other forms of financial engineering, the new securities are believed by the 
investors, and often by the intermediaries themselves, to be good substitutes for the 
traditional ones and are consequently issued and bought in great volumes.  At some point, 
news reveals that the new securities are vulnerable to some unattended risks and, in 
particular, are not good substitutes for the traditional securities.  Both investors and 
intermediaries are surprised by the news, and investors sell these false substitutes, moving 
back to the traditional securities that have the cash flows they seek.  As investors fly to 
safety, financial institutions are stuck holding the supply of the new securities (or, worse yet, 
having to dump them in a fire sale because they are leveraged).  The prices of traditional 
securities rise while those of the new ones fall sharply. 
A notorious recent example of this narrative is securitization of mortgages during the 
2000s.  Various macroeconomic events, including sharp reductions in government debt 
during the Clinton administration and massive demand for safe US assets by foreigners, 
created a shortage of safe fixed income securities.  By pooling and tranching mortgages and 
other loans, financial institutions engineered AAA-rated mortgage backed securities (MBS) 
as substitutes for US government bonds.  The perception that these securities were safe, 
apparently shared by both buyers and intermediaries who engineered them, was justified by 
historically low default rates on mortgages in the US and by more or less continuously 3 
 
growing home prices since World War II.  Trillions of dollars of mortgage- and other asset-
backed securities were created and sold to investors.  
Both the holders of these securities and financial intermediaries appeared to be caught 
by surprise in the summer of 2007, when the news that AAA-rated securities were not safe hit 
the market.  It is not that investors failed to understand that home prices could decline and 
mortgages could default.  Yet two things came as rather substantial surprises.  The first was 
how fast home prices declined and defaults grew.  Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and Willen 
(2008) show that few, if any, Wall Street professionals expected the housing bubble to deflate 
so rapidly.  The second surprise was the sensitivity of the prices of AAA-rated securities 
engineered from mortgages, especially collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), to home 
prices, a phenomenon largely overlooked by the models utilized by rating agencies (Jarrow, 
Li, Mesler, and van Deventer, 2007; and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009).  As these 
securities were downgraded, prices fell and new issuance stopped.  The losses from MBS 
spread through the financial system, precipitating the market collapse in September 2008.    
This recent episode is far from unique in recent US financial history.  In the 1980s, 
investment banks began selling collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), securities 
created out of mortgage portfolios and intended to substitute for government bonds.  To avoid 
a possible risk to the value of CMOs resulting from mortgage prepayments by homeowners 
(which would occur if interest rates fell and people refinanced their homes) and consequent 
prepayments on the high-yielding bonds, intermediaries engineered CMOs nearly 
invulnerable to prepayment risk if historical patterns continued.  In the early 1990s, however, 
as the Federal Reserve sharply cut interest rates, prepayments skyrocketed to levels 
unprecedented by historical standards, so even the prices of CMOs most protected against 
prepayment risk declined sharply.  The investors were caught by surprise and dumped the 
CMOs, turning back to government bonds (Carroll and Lappen, 1994).  Financial 4 
 
intermediaries were evidently caught by surprise as well, and many (particularly those who 
sold prepayment insurance) suffered substantial losses.  Like the collapse of home prices in 
2007 - 2009, massive prepayments appear to have been unanticipated by the market.  
A similar narrative describes what happened to money market funds in 2008.  The 
industry was originally created to offer investors a substitute for bank deposits, with slightly 
higher returns, instant liquidity, and no risk.  Because investment in money market funds was 
not protected by deposit insurance, however, these funds were engineered never to “break the 
buck”, that is, have their value per share drop below $1.  To slightly raise returns, prime 
money market funds invested in generally safe nongovernment securities, such as commercial 
paper.  The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to its default on commercial 
paper, which caused one large holder of that paper, the Reserve Fund, to break the buck 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010).  This event shocked investors and precipitated hundreds of 
billions of dollars in withdrawals not just from the Reserve Fund, but also from the whole 
prime money market fund sector, and a return to traditional bank deposits and government 
securities only funds (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky, 2010). Only government 
guarantees of prime money market funds saved the industry. 
In this paper, we present a model that captures some key elements of this narrative.  
The model shares with the traditional accounts of financial innovation, such as Ross (1976) 
and Allen and Gale (1994), the view that innovation is driven by investor demand for 
particular cash flow patterns.  This demand allows intermediaries to profitably engineer these 
patterns out of other cash flows.  We add two new assumptions to this standard story.   
First, we assume that both investors and financial intermediaries do not attend to 
certain improbable risks when trading the new securities.  This assumption captures what we 
take to be the central feature of the historical episodes we describe: the neglect of potentially 
huge defaults in the housing bubble and of the sensitivity of AAA-rated securities to these 5 
 
defaults, the neglect of the possibility of massive prepayments in the early 1990s, or the 
neglect of the possibility that a money market fund can break the buck.  We model the 
neglect of certain states of the world using the idea of local thinking, introduced by Gennaioli 
and Shleifer (2010), which is a formalization of the notion that not all contingencies are 
represented in the decision maker’s thought process.  The neglect of some states of the world 
in models used to price CDOs is a good example.   
Second, we make the preferred habitat assumption that investors have a very strong 
preference for safe cash flow patterns.  We model this assumption through preferences, 
namely, infinite risk aversion, but it can reflect psychological or institutional characteristics 
of demand.  An alternative way to model such demand might be to consider investors who 
have lexicographic preferences with respect to particular characteristics of investments (e.g., 
AAA ratings).  Yet another approach might be to stress regulatory requirements imposed on 
investors such as banks and insurance companies that favor safe assets.  This assumption on 
demand is not strictly necessary for our results but makes them much stronger.
1  We have 
obtained similar results in a model with finite risk aversion and Epstein-Zin preferences.  
We then examine a standard model modified by these two assumptions and obtain 
three main results.  First, as in the standard model, there is room for financial innovation to 
offer investors cash flow streams that are not available from traditional securities in sufficient 
supply.  However, when some risks are neglected, securities are over-issued relative to what 
would be possible under rational expectations.  The reason is that neglected risks need not be 
laid off on intermediaries or other parties when manufacturing new securities.  Investors thus 
end up bearing risk without recognizing that they are doing so.   
Second, markets in new securities are fragile.  A small piece of news that brings to 
investors’ minds the previously unattended risks catches them by surprise and causes them to 
                                                 
1 The demand for riskless debt can also come from the preference for information-insensitive claims (Gorton 
and Pennacchi, 1990; and Demarzo and Duffie, 1999).   6 
 
drastically revise their valuations of new securities and to sell them. The problem occurs 
precisely because new securities have been over-issued: there are not enough cash flows in 
the neglected states of the world to make promised payments in full.  When investors realize 
that the new securities are false substitutes for the traditional ones, they fly to safety, 
dumping these securities on the market and buying the truly safe ones.
2  
Third, in equilibrium financial intermediaries buy back many of the new securities.  
But their aggregate wealth might be much smaller than that of investors, which limits their 
ability to absorb the huge supply of the new securities. As a consequence, the prices of these 
false substitutes fall sharply, even without traditional fire sales due to leverage (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992).  Prices of traditional securities rise as investors fly to safety.  
The model thus delivers the basic patterns of financial innovation and financial 
fragility in a new way.  The most important contribution is to connect financial innovation, 
the glut of new securities, surprise about risk, and corresponding financial fragility through a 
unified model of belief formation.  We show that a model in the spirit of Allen and Gale 
(1994), even modified by a preferred habitat formulation of preferences but without neglect 
of certain risks, can deliver some aspects of the narrative, but not over-issuance and the 
fragility it entails.  Without a deviation from rational expectations, one cannot get the basic 
idea of false substitutes: securities investors believe to be riskless turn out to be risky.   
Our model of financial innovation is related to the behavioral finance idea of security 
issuance catering to investor demand as in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Greenwood, 
Hanson, and Stein (2010). Also related is the idea that consumers ignore some attributes of 
products they buy (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).  Henderson and Pearson (2010) study equity 
derivative products called SPARQS, which they argue are introduced to capitalize on investor 
misunderstanding of equity payoff patterns.  Shleifer and Vishny (2010) apply the idea of 
                                                 
2 Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) alternatively model the flight to safety as a response to Knightian 
uncertainty.   Our model accounts for investor optimism and flight to safety in the same framework. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) present a historical perspective on the neglect of low probability risks in financial markets. 7 
 
catering to the financial crisis, but they simply assume optimism as the stimulus for security 
issuance and pessimism as the shock precipitating a crisis.  Here we present a unified model 
of belief formation that accounts for the whole story.   
Our paper is also related to an important theme in the literature on financial fragility, 
namely that both banks and the shadow banking system create private money or liquidity that 
investors demand (Gorton and Metrick, 2010; and Stein, 2010).   Such creation of liquidity is 
usually seen as socially valuable, but entailing systemic risks due to leverage and resulting 
asset fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; and Stein, 2010).  While we recognize the benefits 
of financial innovation, we take a more skeptical view about the social value of liquidity 
creation when investors neglect certain risks.  In such a system, security issuance can be 
excessive and lead to fragility and welfare losses, even in the absence of leverage.  In this 
respect, our paper is closer to Rajan’s (2006) prescient analysis of the risks of financial 
innovation, although we emphasize neglect of unlikely events leading to over-issuance of 
securities instead of incentive problems as a source of instability.             
In the next section, we present a benchmark rational expectations model of financial 
innovation in a pure exchange economy. Section 3 modifies this model to allow for local 
thinking and derives our main results on financial innovation and fragility.  In Section 4, we 
study a production economy, in which innovation under local thinking can lead to investment 
distortions. In Section 5, we discuss welfare in both the exchange and the production 
economies. In the exchange economy, innovation under local thinking could benefit 
intermediaries and harm investors; in a production economy, because innovation distorts 
investment, it can leave everyone worse off.  Section 6 examines the case of fully rational 
intermediaries dealing with locally thinking investors. Section 7 discusses some implications 
of our work for the recent financial crisis.  All proofs are collected in the Appendix. 
 8 
 
2. The model 
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and two assets, B and A, which pay off at t = 2. The 
assets stand for cash flows from projects.  Asset B pays R > 1 for sure. Asset A pays yi with 
probability πi, where i = g (for growth), d (for downturn), r (for recession).  We assume 
 
A.1.   yg >  1  >  yd   >  yr , and  πg  > πd > πr.  
 
Growth is the most likely outcome, and a downturn is more likely than a recession.  
There is a representative intermediary, who is patient and risk neutral.  At t = 0, the 
intermediary owns both assets and sells claims on their returns.  These traditional claims are a 
riskless bond on B that yields R at t = 2, and risky shares in A, which yield yi at t =2.  There is 
a measure 1 of investors, each endowed with wealth w and maximizing utility: 
U = E[C0 + C1 + θ·min(C2g , C2d, C2r)],                                  (1) 
where Ct is consumption at t = 0,1 and C2i denotes consumption in state i at t = 2.  Investors 
are infinitely risk averse with respect to C2 but, because θ > 1, wish to postpone consumption 
to t = 2.  To do so, investors must buy claims on A and B. Investors can, however, freely 
transfer resources from t = 0 to t = 1 without purchasing claims, so t = 0 and t = 1 should be 
viewed as being close together.  Formally, the initial endowment perishes right after t = 1.  
Our results become stronger if resources cannot be transferred from t = 0 to t = 1.   
These preferences conveniently pin down the gains from trade in assets.  Because of 
their greater desire to postpone consumption (θ > 1), investors seek to buy assets from 
intermediaries.  Because they are infinitely risk averse, investors want to buy riskless bonds. 
With only traditional claims, however, some beneficial trades do not occur.  Financial 
innovation improves trading opportunities by splitting up the cash flows of asset A. 
At t = 0, financial claims on A and B are traded and consumption-savings decisions 
are made.  Competition in financial markets pins down the price pA of a share in A and the 
price pB of a bond issued on B.  At t = 1, after portfolios are formed and consumption has 9 
 
taken place at t = 0, agents observe a noisy signal    s s s ,   of payoff y, where  s s  .  After 
observing s, agents can reassess their portfolio and consume.  At t = 2 asset payoffs are 
realized and distributed to the holders of the financial claims, and consumption takes place.   
The signal is characterized by Pr(s| yg) = 1 – γ, Pr(s| yd) = δ, and Pr(s| yr) = ρ, where ρ > δ > γ 
≥ 1/2.  That is, s reduces the probability of growth and is a stronger signal of a recession than 
of a downturn.  The latter feature is captured by ρ > δ and plays a central role in our analysis. 
Our results are starkest when the signal is mildly informative, i.e., ρ ≈ 1/2.  .  
The timing of the financial markets is graphically represented in Fig. 1 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Timing of the Model 
 
2.1. Rational expectations equilibrium with traditional claims 
In choosing how many bonds b and shares a to buy at t = 0 (and thus implicitly the 
initial and future consumption levels C0, C1, C2), each investor solves 
) ( max
, a y b R b p a p w r B A a b     θ                                    (2) 
   s.t.    w –  pAa + pBb ≥ 0.  
 
In our model, under rational expectations, there is no re-trading at t = 1, so the agent’s 
portfolio problem can be formulated as one in which assets are held to maturity until t = 2. 
The infinitely risk averse investor cares about his time 2 consumption only in the worst state, 
a recession.  In contrast, at t = 0 the intermediary supplies b bonds and a shares to maximize   
) 1 ( E ) 1 ( Π max
,
a y b R b p a p B A
b a
      .                                 (3) 
t = 0 
Financial claims are 
traded, and prices pB 
and pA are set  
t = 1 
Signal s is observed, financial 
claims are re-traded, and new 
prices pB1 and pA1 are set.  
    t = 2 
Asset returns are realized 
and distributed to claimants 10 
 
When b (or a) is negative, intermediaries are buying bonds (shares).  This possibility never 
arises in equilibrium, but it uniquely pins down equilibrium prices.  To find these prices, 
consider agents’ reservation values for different assets.  From Eq. (2), investors’ reservation 
prices are equal to θR for bonds and θyr for shares.  Due to infinite risk aversion, shares are 
valued at their lowest payoff.  Whenever the price of one or both securities is lower than the 
respective reservation price, the investor saves all of his wealth (setting C0 = C1 = 0) and 
purchases securities, starting with the one with the lowest price to reservation value ratio. 
Eq. (3) implies that the intermediary’s reservation prices are equal to R for bonds and 
E(y) for shares.  The intermediary then sells all securities whose price is above the reservation 
value and keeps the remaining ones.  We assume for simplicity that 
 
A.2. E(y|s) > θ·yd  and  w >   w max[θ(R + yr),(R + yd)].  
 
The first part of A.2 ensures that, even after observing a low signal s, the intermediaries value 
shares substantially more than investors. This implies that there is no trade in shares either at 
t = 0 or at t = 1 and that the portfolios formed at t = 0 will not be rebalanced after observing s.  
The second part of A.2 ensures that investors are wealthy enough to absorb the total supply of 
bonds even at their reservation price pB = θ·R [formally, A.2 implies that  1 ) /(  R w   ].  We 
can show that under A.2 the equilibrium at t = 0 is described by Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1. Under rational expectations and a traditional claim structure, the financial markets 
equilibrium at t = 0 is characterized by a = 0, b = 1, pA = Ey, and pB = θ·R. 
In this equilibrium, displayed in Fig. 2, investors absorb all bonds, their price is 
maximal, and shares do not trade (pA = Ey assures there are no trades among intermediaries). 
Intermediaries’ supply of bonds is initially flat at pB  =  R  but becomes vertical after all 
available bonds are sold.  Investors’ demand is initially flat at pB = θR but begins to slope 
down after all of their wealth is used to buy w/θR bonds, so pB must drop below θR for them 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Equilibrium without Innovation 
 
to absorb a larger supply.  A.2 directly implies that there is a shortage of a safe store of value. 
This shortage keeps pB at θR, allowing intermediaries to earn a unit profit (θ – 1)·R from bond 
sales.  Investors’ payoff at t = 0 is UI = w; intermediaries’ payoff is Π = θ·R + Ey. 
After a signal s is observed at t = 1, nothing happens to portfolios and consumption. 
Investors keep the bonds purchased at t = 0, the price of which stays constant at pB = θ·R. 
Share prices fluctuate with the expected return of asset A because Ey is affected by the signal 
s, but no trading in shares takes place.  In this equilibrium, it is irrelevant how consumers and 
intermediaries divide their t = 0 income between C0 and C1. 
 
2.2. Rational expectations equilibrium with financial innovation 
We view financial innovation as the repackaging by intermediaries of the payoff on A 
so as to relax the shortage of bonds.  The intermediary carves out of the risky asset a new 
claim having the same cash flow pattern as a riskless bond, namely, promising to repay R in 
all states of the world.  The amount of these new riskless claims the intermediary can issue is 
limited by the lowest possible return yr of A, because the maximum aggregate repayment the 
pB 
R 
b  w/(θ·R)  1 
   
  Profits 
Demand 
Supply  
θ·R 12 
 
intermediary can pledge in all states of nature under the new claims is precisely yr.  As a 
consequence, the volume f of the new riskless claims issued in this way must satisfy 
R y f f r
RE /   .                                                      (4) 
If f > yr/R, the new claim is risky because in a recession intermediaries cannot pay out the 
promised return R to all claimholders. If f ≤ yr/R, the new claim is riskless.  Even in the worst 
state, intermediaries can repay R to all claimants.  Unlike the bond, which is necessarily 
riskless because it pledges B’s riskless return, the new claim is paid out of a risky return and 
is, therefore, riskless only if issued in a sufficiently low volume.  We thus model financial 
innovation as the creation of substitute securities mimicking exactly the cash flows of bonds 
that are demanded by investors but are in short supply.  It is optimal for intermediaries to 
introduce a safe claim because infinitely risk-averse investors do not value the upside of risky 
claims.  This innovation can also be interpreted as issuing riskless debt against the cash flow 
of risky asset A.  After having issued f new claims, the residual risky return y – fR from A is 
pledged to the shareholders.   
Consider now the market equilibrium.  Denote the t = 0 price of the new claim by pN.  
The new claim must fetch the same price as a bond (i.e., pN = pB), because the two securities 
have identical cash flows.  Financial innovation boosts the supply b of bonds by the amount 
yr/R.  The new equilibrium in the market for riskless claims is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Equilibrium with Innovation Under Rational Expectations 
θ·R 
B 
R 
b 
w/(θ·R)   1 
Demand 
New supply 
1+yr /R 13 
 
Under A.2, the boost in the supply of riskless claims triggered by financial innovation 
reduces but does not eliminate this shortage, because R y R w r / 1 /    .  It is, therefore, still 
the case that the price of safe claims is equal to investors’ reservation price, namely, pN = pB 
= θ·R.  The wealth of investors is sufficiently high to absorb all new claims at that price. 
Share prices are now equal to pA = Ey – yr because the volume of innovation is maximal and 
so the risky asset’s lowest payout is pledged to the holders of the new claim. In the 
equilibrium depicted in Fig. 3, the intermediary’s profit from innovation is equal to 
) 1 ( ) 1 (       r
RE y R f .                                           (5) 
The intermediary’s profit rises with yr because more securities can be issued and with 
investors’ time preference θ because the price of the new securities is higher. 
To summarize the analysis thus far, under A.2 the financial markets equilibrium at t = 
0 under rational expectations and financial innovation is described by Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2. Under rational expectations, the equilibrium at t = 0 with financial innovation is 
characterized by a = 0, b = 1 + yr /R, pA =Ey – yr, and pN = pB = θ·R. 
 
At t = 1, financial innovation does not affect the reaction of markets to the signal s. 
Regardless of the signal, the price of riskless claims does not change and neither do portfolios 
or consumption.  Only pA fluctuates with the expected return on A.  In this equilibrium, it 
does not matter whether consumption takes place at t = 0 or t = 1.  
Finally, consider the welfare consequences of innovation.  With innovation, the total 
payoff of investors as of t = 0 stays at UI = w while the intermediary’s payoff becomes Πinn = 
θ·R + (θ – 1)yr + Ey, which is the no-innovation profit Π plus the profits from innovation.  
Social welfare at t = 0 is thus higher with innovation, just as in Allen and Gale (1994).  The 
social benefit of financial innovation here consists of relaxing the aggregate shortage of 
riskless bonds.  This benefit in our model accrues entirely to the intermediaries because, in 
the market equilibrium, investors purchase riskless claims at their reservation price. 14 
 
Our model builds on the idea that a key feature of financial innovation is to allow 
intermediaries to cater to investors’ demand for particular claims, namely, riskless bonds.  
The initial excess demand for such bonds gives intermediaries the incentive to manufacture 
an identical riskless security out of a risky cash flow.  With infinitely risk-averse investors, 
the model describes securitizations expanding the supply of AAA securities.  With rational 
expectations, financial innovation allows gains from trade to be realized and is strictly 
beneficial.  Although this effect of financial innovation shows up in the case of local thinking 
as well, in that world it can lead to excessive innovation and financial fragility.  
 
3. Financial innovation under local thinking 
We consider departures from rational expectations due to agents’ limited ability to 
represent uncertainty.  To do so, we follow the Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) model of local 
thinking. That model, which provides a unified explanation of several anomalies in 
judgments but admits Bayesian rationality as a special case, builds on the notion that agents’ 
inferences are made on the basis of a selected subset of possible events, not on the entire state 
space.  Intuitively, not all states of the world come to mind.  The agent does not think of 
everything when imagining the future.
3  Crucially, the selection of events from the state space 
is shaped by their true underlying probabilities: More likely events are ceteris paribus easier 
to retrieve from memory than less likely ones.  This feature allows one to consider how 
historical frequencies and news combine to create judgment biases, particularly news that 
changes the agent’s representations.       
We model local thinking by assuming that an agent does not think of all three possible 
states i = g, d, r of the risky asset’s payoff but only the two most likely ones.  The agent then 
conditions his inferences about the payoff of A on the two states that come to mind, ignoring 
                                                 
3 Other models of unforeseen contingencies, surveyed by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998), are less 
tractable and focus on studying how the awareness of being unaware of some states affects choice, instead of on 
how the set of contingencies that comes to mind is endogenously determined and updated.  15 
 
the remaining state.  To see how this works, consider a local thinker’s representation of the 
future at t = 0.  Because by assumption πg > πd > πr, the states that come to mind are g and d, 
so the agent assesses Pr
L(yg) = Pr(yg| yg, yd) = πg/(πg + πd) and Pr
L(yd) = Pr(yd| yg, yd) = πd/(πg + 
πd), where superscript L stands for local.  At t = 0, the local thinker exaggerates the 
probabilities of growth and downturn and neglects the possibility of a recession.  
After s is observed at t = 1, the agent’s assessments are revised.  What comes to mind 
at this point depends on the true posterior probabilities πi(s) = Pr(yi|s) for i = g, d, r.  Because 
the prior probability of growth is fairly high and we focus on scarcely informative signals 
(formally ρ ≈ 1/2), yg is still the most likely outcome after s is observed.  This implies that 
state g is always included in the agent’s representation.  Consider now the probability ranking 
of a downturn and a recession.  If the signal is good ( s s  ), this ranking does not change as 
πd(s) > πr(s).  Observing a good signal after a history of economic stability confirms the 
initial representations encoded in assumption A.1. 
A bad signal s = s in contrast is generally informative of lower growth, but especially 
about a recession, as formally captured by the assumption that ρ > δ.  In this case, so long as  
A.3.  
r
d


      ˆ ,                                                                                     
we have that πr(s) > πd(s), namely, a recession becomes more likely than a mere downturn.  If 
the prior probabilities πd and πr are not far apart, A.3 is easily met and we henceforth assume 
that it is.  This implies that after s = s the representation of uncertainty changes drastically: 
The agent now neglects the possibility of a mere downturn by including state r at the expense 
of d into his representation and thus forms his assessments conditional on yg and yr.  
By formalizing the change in agents’ representations, local thinking yields two 
distinct effects of bad news.  The first and most fundamental effect is to prompt agents to 
consider the possibility of a recession.  Initially, after a period of economic stability, limited 16 
 
representations lead agents to neglect this unlikely risk.  After observing a piece of bad news 
(such as a bank failure), the initially unattended-to possibility of a recession comes to mind. 
The second effect is that news could induce overreaction.  With limited representations, as 
the possibility of a recession comes to mind, other, more favorable, states are crowded out of 
agents’ attention.  This crowding out leads to over-weighting of the probability of recession, 
which could (but need not) induce a switch from the initial optimism to pessimism.
4            
Although overreaction leads to stronger effects, the main results of our model rely 
merely on the neglect of the possibility of a recession at t = 0.  In fact, as we formally show in 
Proposition 2, the false substitute effect arises even if the agent’s assessment at t = 1 is 
rational, much as if agents were to learn the true distribution of states after observing s.
5    
 
3.1. Local thinking equilibrium and innovation at t = 0 
We solve the model by assuming that investors and intermediaries are local thinkers 
holding the same beliefs. In Section 6 we consider rational expectations intermediaries.   
If the intermediary does not innovate, the equilibrium at t = 0 is very similar to the 
rational expectations case in Lemma 1, except that the share price is now equal to pA = E
Ly = 
E(y| y = yg, yd), which is the value for asset A’s cash flow expected by a local thinker.  When 
the intermediary innovates, then, given agents’ representations at t = 0, the change from the 
                                                 
4After observing s, a local thinker estimates an average payoff of E(y|yg,yr,s), which is lower than the rational 
agent’s estimate when E(y|yg,yr,s) < yd. If E(y|yg,yr,s) = yd, the local and rational thinker’s assessments are 
identical (the local thinker is optimistic otherwise). Thus, the switch from optimism to pessimism arises when 
the recession is very bad, i.e., yr is low. Pessimism could also arise in our model if the probability of growth is 
sufficiently low that after s state yg is disregarded. None of our main results changes under these alternative 
specifications. We have chosen the structure of A.1 to highlight the fact that the basic mechanism of our model 
does not require pessimism and could arise even if the local thinker’s t = 1 assessments are fully rational.      
5 More generally, although local thinking provides a model of probability distortions and overreaction, the mere 
distortion of probabilities and updating is not sufficient for our results. For example, we would not get them in a 
model of under- and overreaction along the lines of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The key cognitive 
problem our agents suffer from is the neglect of the possibility that yr might happen. This assumption interacts 
with infinite risk aversion to cause assets to be priced based only on the worst case scenario that agents 
contemplate. But even if risk aversion is finite, the neglect of low payoff states plays an important role by 
creating the possibility that security issuance is excessive relative to the available cash flows.    17 
 
rational expectations case is substantial.  When state r is neglected, the number of new 
riskless claims that the intermediary can potentially issue is equal to  
R y f d
L /  .                                                         (6) 
Because at t = 0 agents do not pay attention to the possibility of a recession, riskless 
claims can be issued until all cash flow yd in a downturn is pledged to investors.  The 
potential volume of financial innovation with local thinking is higher than with rational 
expectations (formally f 
L > f 
RE since yd > yr) because cash flows in a downturn instead of a 
recession can now be pledged to create a substitute for a riskless bond.  If investors are 
sufficiently wealthy, the price of riskless claims stays at pN = pB = θ·R and the extra profit 
from innovation obtained by the intermediary is equal to  
) 1 ( ) 1 (       d
L y R f ,                                              (7) 
which is higher than the profit in Eq. (5) under rational expectations.  The reason for higher 
profits is the greater volume of innovation.  If instead investors’ wealth is not so high, 
innovation can boost the supply of the riskless claim to the point that pB and pN fall below θR, 
so the equilibrium lies in the downward portion of investors’ demand curve as in Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Equilibrium with financial innovation under local thinking 
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pB could be so low that an intermediary’s profit from innovation falls below the level in Eq. 
(7).
6  If the price drops to pB = pN = R, intermediaries may be willing to supply fewer claims 
than f 
L.  A.2 simplifies the analysis by ruling out this case.  In fact,  w w   implies that, when 
f 
L is issued, the equilibrium price pB = pN = wR /(R +yd) is above R.  
 
Proposition 1 Under local thinking, the volume of innovation is R y f d
L /  .  At t  =  0, b   =   1 
+  f 
L, a = 0, and pA  =  E(y| yg, yd) –   yd.  There are two cases:  (1) If  ) ( d y R w w     , then pN  
= pB  =  wR /(R +yd) < θR;  (2) If  ) ( d y R w   , then pN  = pB = θ·R.  
 
When investors’ wealth w is high relative to the supply of riskless claims, demand for 
new claims is high, and so is pB.  The reverse is true when investors’ wealth is low relative to 
the amount of riskless claims issued.  In this case, the boost in the supply of riskless assets 
triggered by innovation can reduce the price of all safe assets, including the traditional bond, 
below the no-innovation level.  Under local thinking, the volume of new claims issued is 
higher (and the price pB lower) than under rational expectations.  This is so because locally 
thinking intermediaries and investors see asset A as having a smaller downside risk than do 
their rational expectations counterparts.  This encourages the supply of the new claim, which 
investors see as a riskless bond.  The issuance glut created by local thinking has far-reaching 
implications for financial fragility. 
The intermediary’s wealth at t = 1 also plays a key role in affecting fragility.  To 
highlight this role, we allow the fraction σ of income carried by intermediaries to t = 1 to be 
anywhere in [0,1].  In this model σ is indeterminate, for the intermediary is indifferent 
between consuming the income obtained by selling claims at t = 0 or at t = 1. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Under rational expectations this case could not occur by virtue of assumption A.2, which implies that 
investors’ wealth is sufficiently large that they can absorb f 
RE new claims at their reservation value θ·R. 19 
 
3.2. Local thinking equilibrium and innovation at t = 1 
The fact that local thinking boosts the volume of innovation relative to rational 
expectations profoundly alters the reaction of markets to the signal s at t = 1.  These effects 
do not play out if the signal is good.  In this case, representations do not change and the effect 
of news under local thinking is very similar to that under rational expectations.  The price for 
riskless claims is unaffected by news because after observing s the new claim is still 
perceived to be riskless, while share prices rise to pA (s) = E(y| y = yg, yd, s) – yd.  
When the signal is bad, matters are very different because now downside risk is 
represented as a recession with a payoff yr instead of as a downturn with a payoff yd. 
Investors now realize that the new claims are not riskless.  This is so because the volume of 
new securities issued is f 
L= yd /R, so the total repayment promised to investors is equal to yd, 
which exceeds the resources available in a recession.  In a recession, intermediaries can repay 
to each holder of the new claim an amount equal to 
R R
y
y
d
r   .                                                            (8) 
The large volume f 
L of new securities issued under local thinking plays a critical role 
here.  It is because f 
L is so large that in a recession the new securities become risky in the 
aggregate.  The arrival of s = s reveals to investors that, contrary to their initial belief, the 
new claim is very different from the safe bond it sought to replicate and drastically reduces 
their valuation of that claim.  This is true even if the news is not very informative and 
investors realize that a recession is still unlikely (i.e., πr is small), so that most of the time the 
new claim repays the promised amount R.  The possibility of a recession destroys the very 
idea that made the new claim appealing to investors at t = 0, namely, that it was just like a 20 
 
riskless bond. The new claims are not true substitutes for the traditional claims.  They are 
false substitutes, severely affecting financial markets at t = 1.
7 
After seeing s, investors’ reservation price for the traditional bond is equal to θ·R 
while that for the new claim drops to θ(yr/yd)·R, the present value of the latter claim’s payout 
in a recession.  In contrast, the intermediary’s reservation price for traditional bonds is equal 
to R and that for the new claim is equal to 
  ) ( Pr ) ( Pr ) / ( s y s y y y where R g
L
r
L
d r
L L      .                         (9) 
Risk neutral intermediaries value the new claim at their perceived expected repayment.  Here 
1 
L   reflects the drop in the new claim’s expected payout.  Our analysis is general, but our 
results are best appreciated in the case in which s is barely informative about repayment even 
for a local thinker, namely,  1 
L   (once again, this requires πr to be small).     
These reservation prices lead to two important observations. First, after seeing s, 
investors value the new claim less than the bond, creating a force toward the segmentation of 
the previously unified market for safe claims.  Second, investors’ reservation price for the 
new claim could fall below intermediaries’ reservation price [this occurs when θ(yr/yd) < ω
L]. 
In this case, investors wish to sell the new claims back to intermediaries, who, depending on 
their wealth σ, might or might not have the money to buy them. 
To see how prices are set at t = 1, we focus on the case in which the price of safe 
claims at t = 0 is below θ·R and investors’ valuation of the new claim at t = 1 falls below 
intermediaries’ valuation, namely, when θ(yr/yd) < ω
L.  This captures a scenario in which 
innovation is so extensive as to affect the bond market at t = 0 and it induces a misallocation 
of the new claim at t = 1.  The latter condition is crucial for it is precisely when innovation 
transfers a claim to the low valuation market participant that a false substitute effect arises.    
                                                 
7 The new claim pays less than the traditional bond in yr no matter what the t = 1 signal is, but investors 
recognize this at t = 1 if, and only if, the signal is s, which is why markets are fragile only in that state.  21 
 
One immediate consequence of our previous discussion is that after observing s the 
price of traditional bonds rises from its initial level pB = wR /(R +yd) < θ·R to investors’ 
reservation level, pB1 = θ·R.  This rise is connected to the drop in investors’ valuation of the 
new securities.  After realizing that the new claim is risky, investors try to sell it in the market 
to increase current consumption and to purchase the truly riskless bonds.  This boost in the 
demand for bonds encounters a limited supply, which causes bond prices to rise.  At the same 
time, the price of the new claim must drop, for the maximal valuation ω
LR of that claim in the 
market is lower than its t = 0 price.  As a consequence, once investors realize that the new 
securities are false substitutes for the old ones, there is a flight to safety, causing bond prices 
to rise and the price of the new claim to fall. 
The extent of the new claim’s price drop crucially depends on the wealth of the 
intermediaries.  Suppose that the intermediaries carry little or no wealth to t = 1, so that they 
do not have the resources to buy all of the new claims, even when the latter are priced at 
investors’ valuation θ·(yr/yd)·R.  Fig. 5 depicts the resulting equilibrium at t =1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Equilibrium at t = 1 with finanicial innovation under local thinking 
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In equilibrium, the new claim’s price drops to investors’ valuation θ·(yr/yd)·R even though 
intermediaries are willing to buy it at a higher price.  The problem is that intermediaries have 
little wealth and thus can absorb only some new claims.  This low demand by intermediaries 
(the downward sloping curve in the bottom part of Fig. 5) leads to a major price drop.   
Intuitively, as the wealth σ of intermediaries increases, their demand also rises, 
potentially driving the equilibrium price of the new claim above θ·(yr/yd)·R.  In the extreme 
case of σ = 1, intermediaries carry all of their t = 0 income to t = 1 and thus have enough 
funds to buy all of the new claims at the initial equilibrium price pB (after all, they obtained 
these resources by selling the new claims at t = 0).  But then intermediaries can a fortiori 
afford to buy all of the new claims at their reservation price  R
L   , which is below the initial 
price  B p . When σ = 1, the equilibrium price must thus settle at pN1  =  R
L    to make 
intermediaries willing to absorb precisely the amount of new claims held by investors. 
This discussion allows us to decompose the drop in the new claim’s price into two 
parts.  The first is the difference between the initial price pB = wR/(R+yd) and intermediaries’ 
reservation price  R
L   .  This price drop represents the elimination of any premium paid for 
the new claim over and above its expected payoff.  Investors initially paid this premium 
because they wrongly believed the new claim to be a substitute for the riskless bond in short 
supply.  The second part is the drop from  R
L    to θ·(yr/yd)·R.  Even if the new claim is only 
mildly risky, it is not what investors wanted (given their infinite risk aversion).  Thus, they 
dump it on the market. Because intermediaries cannot absorb this claim in large volumes 
given their limited wealth, its equilibrium price settles at investors’ reservation price, which 
is below the expected payoff.  Here over-issuance exacerbates fragility by boosting the 
supply of new claims that must be held by disgruntled investors (shifting out the upward 
sloping supply in the bottom part of Fig. 5).  23 
 
These broad patterns of market segmentation and financial fragility, as well as the role 
of intermediaries’ wealth, extend to other parameter constellations.  
 
Proposition 2 After news s, the traditional bond trades at pB1 = θ·R, and the price of the new 
claim drops to  pN1 < pN.  There are two cases. 
(1) If  ), / ( d r
L y y   θ ω  then pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R and new claims are not traded.  
(2) If ), / ( d r
L y y   θ ω  then pN1 = 1() N p  , where  1() N p   is an increasing function 
with  R y y p d r ) / ( ) 0 (   ,  R p
L   ) 1 ( . When  > 0, some new claims are re-
traded. For a given  , the price drop (pB – pN1) (i) decreases (weakly) in yr and (ii) 
increases (weakly) in yd if, and only if, yd <  *
d y   for some threshold  *
d y .    
 
A general feature of the model is that the bond price at t = 1 is equal to its maximum 
possible value θ·R.  Bond prices thus rise at t = 1 when their initial price pB is below θ·R, as in 
case (1) of Proposition 1.  The price of the new claim always falls below its t = 0 level. If 
θ(yr/yd) ≥ ω
L, this price drops to investors’ reservation level and no re-trading occurs.  In this 
case, the intermediaries’ wealth does not matter because they are the low valuation market 
participants. In the most interesting case, where θ(yr/yd) <  ω
L, intermediaries wish to buy back 
some new claims, thus helping to support their price. However, if their wealth σ is 
insufficient, they are unable to do so, creating a large price drop.  Given the key role of 
intermediaries’ wealth in shaping price fluctuations, in Sections 4 and 6 we pin down σ by 
introducing production and rational intermediaries, respectively.  
We have implicitly assumed no innovation at t = 1 after s is observed.  In practice, 
investors (not intermediaries) could repackage new claims, keeping the safe portion (yr/yd)R 
for themselves and selling off the risky portion to intermediaries.  Such re-tranching might 
improve risk allocation in the economy, but it would only marginally attenuate financial 24 
 
fragility when intermediaries’ wealth is low.  Low-wealth intermediaries would be able to 
pay very little for the risky portion of new claims, keeping their price low. 
  One could also consider innovations that, instead of replicating the bond’s cash flow, 
supply Arrow-Debreu securities.  If intermediaries supply two such securities, one paying one 
dollar if the state is yg, the other if the state is not yg (i.e., if the economy slows down), 
investors could replicate the safe asset by purchasing an equal amount of them.  This form of 
innovation also leads to over-issuance: All of the cash flow yd available in a downturn is sold 
under the security paying out in the slowdown as local thinking investors and intermediaries 
identify such slowdown with cash flow yd, not yr.  As the economy’s slowdown is revised 
downward to yr, however, this security cannot be repaid in full and its price drops.  The only 
difference with our current setup is that Arrow-Debreu claims automatically allow investors 
to implement the outcome attained under re-tranching by selling the securities that pay out in 
yg until the investor’s portfolio pays the same in all future states. 
Proposition 2 shows how, for a given σ, parameters yr and yd determine financial 
fragility, viewed as the drop in the new claim’s prices after s is observed.  A milder recession 
(a higher yr) reduces fragility by rendering the new claim less risky, which raises the 
reservation prices of investors and intermediaries at t = 1.  By boosting the supply of new 
claims at t = 0, a milder downturn (a higher yd) exerts two opposite effects on fragility.  On 
the one hand, the higher supply at t = 0 reduces the price of new claims at t = 1 by increasing 
the quantity that intermediaries must absorb and by rendering these claims more risky.  These 
effects enhance fragility.  On the other hand, higher supply of new claims at t = 0 reduces 
their equilibrium price at t = 0, which dampens fragility.  In this way, financial innovation 
creates an inverted-U shaped relation between fragility and agents’ optimism (as measured by 
yd).  When agents are very optimistic, the supply of new assets expands, reducing these 
assets’ prices today as well as the price decline after s is observed. 25 
 
Having explored the fragility of the new claim, we turn to the impact of innovation 
and the neglect of risks on aggregate financial markets.  We measure financial activity by the 
market value pB·b + pN ·f + pA·a of all claims, which depends on whether or not innovation 
occurs and on market participants’ information.  Let 
L I
z V
,  denote the market value obtained 
under innovation and local thinking (as denoted by the superscript I,L).  Index z captures 
market participants’ information and takes a value in   s s, , 0,  w h e r e   z = 0 denotes the 
information at t = 0, z = s the information at t = 1 after a bad signal, and z = s the information 
at t = 1 after a good signal.  Let 
L
z V  denote the market value of claims prevailing under no 
innovation with information z.  Let 
RE I
z V
, and 
RE
z V  denote the corresponding values under 
rational expectations.  Focusing for simplicity on the case of σ = 0, we establish Corollary 1.  
 
Corollary 1 If θ(yr/yd) <  ω
L, innovation boosts market volatility under local thinking but not 
under rational expectations. Formally, 
L
z
L L I
z
L I V V V V    0
, ,
0  while 
RE
z
RE RE I
z
RE I V V V V    0
, ,
0   for z = s,s.   
 
The combination of local thinking and financial innovation amplifies the market’s 
response to news.  Without innovation, market fluctuations are entirely due to changes in the 
price of claims that everyone understands are risky (the magnitude of such fluctuations 
depends on whether agents are rational or not).  When expectations are rational, this remains 
true under innovation as well, since the risky claim still bears all of the fundamental risk. 
Matters are very different under local thinking.  To see this, consider Fig. 6, which is drawn 
for w > θ(R+yd) [i.e., case (2) of Proposition 1]. 26 
 
Fig. 6. Financial innovation and market volatility 
 
As the upper branches in Fig. 6 show, in good times (i.e., at t = 0 and in state s) 
financial innovation allows intermediaries to expand financial assets by manufacturing new, 
apparently safe claims that risk-averse investors are eager to buy.  When bad news arrives 
and the neglected risk becomes manifest, this innovation entails extreme fragility.  Although 
the revelation of neglected risks also causes the market to drop in the absence of innovation, 
the  price drop is much larger with innovation because the neglected risk has now been 
loaded more heavily onto investors through their holdings of new, supposedly safe, claims.  
Because investors are inefficient risk bearers and intermediaries have limited wealth, the 
market collapses.  In sum, when some risks are neglected, financial innovation enhances the 
volatility of financial markets.  This is again due to the false substitutes effect, which entails a 
market boom in good times and a market collapse after bad news arrives. 
 
3.3. Innovation, local thinking, and financial fragility: discussion 
  Our model places the demand for new claims at the heart of the link between financial 
innovation and fragility. Investors’ initial excess demand for safe claims encourages 
intermediaries to manufacture new claims out of risky cash flows that are perceived to be 
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equally safe.  As investors realize that the new claims are a false substitute for the old ones, 
their reluctance to hold on to these claims triggers a sharp price drop even after marginally 
bad news.  These marked shifts in the demand for the new safe claims are intimately 
connected to financial innovation.  
The pressure to create new safe claims is strong precisely when investors disregard 
specific risks such as a possible collapse of home prices in light of favorable recent history. 
This optimism boosts intermediaries’ ability to sell new claims and thus their incentive to 
innovate.  The issuance glut renders the new claim vulnerable to the arrival of bad news that 
brings to mind previously neglected risks and thus the critical fact that the new claims are not 
as safe as the assets they sought to replicate.  Because of their preferred habitats, investors try 
to rebalance their portfolios in favor of the truly safe traditional claims, triggering massive 
sales of the new claims and price drops.  Such sales are not driven by leverage or liquidation 
demands, as in standard fire sales models, but by the fall in demand that arises as investors 
realize that these new securities are false substitutes for the old ones.    
The general message of our model is that, when investors neglect certain risks, 
financial innovation creates a false substitutability between the new and traditional claims. 
This false substitutability explains both the excessive volume of innovation ex ante and the ex 
post flight to quality occurring as investors come to realize that the new claim exposes them 
to previously unattended to risks.  Although the motives for financial innovation are the same 
in our model as in Allen and Gale (1994), the consequences are very different.  In our model, 
innovation benefits intermediaries who earn large profits selling securities at t = 0 but hurts 
investors, who are lured into an inefficient risk allocation and suffer from ex-post price drops.  
Investors’ losses depend on the liquidity of intermediaries and their ability to provide 
backstop insurance against price drops at t = 1.   As we show in Section 4, in an economy 
with production both investors and intermediaries might lose from innovation.   28 
 
4. Innovation and local thinking in a production economy 
Suppose that instead of owning assets, the intermediaries have exclusive access to 
production technologies (or activities) B and A.  Activity B yields R at t = 2 for any unit 
invested at t = 0.  The return of activity A is stochastic, equal to yi with probability πi, where 
as before i = g, d, r.  The riskless activity is in limited supply, in the sense that investment IB 
in activity B cannot exceed one.  Investment IA in activity A is in principle unbounded.  
The intermediary has initial wealth wint < 1 but can raise additional funds from 
investors by selling claims on A and B.  The traditional claim to finance B is a riskless bond 
priced at pB at t = 0 and yields R at t = 2; the traditional claim to finance A has a unit cost pA 
and yields yi at t = 2.  The difference from the pure exchange economy of Sections 2 and 3 is 
that now the supply of claims must be consistent with the intermediary’s optimal investment 
decisions.  For brevity, we study this production economy only under local thinking, but we 
later discuss the role of limited representations.  In the absence of innovation, the 
intermediary chooses investment levels IB and IA, and issues volumes b and a of traditional 
claims to solve   
AB ,, I, I, , max
AB ba i i   R(IB-b) + E
Ly(IA – a) – IB – IA + bpB + apA + wint             (10) 
                            s.t.       IB = bpB + iB,                                                                     (11)  
  IA = apA + iA,                                                                     (12)    
  iB + iA ≤ wint ,                                                                     (13) 
and                                               b ≤ IB ≤ 1,  a ≤ IA.                                                              (14) 
In Eq. (10), the intermediary’s payoff is equal to the output generated by A and B net of 
investors’ repayment, minus investment costs, plus the revenue from security sales at t = 0.  
Constraints (11) and (12) say that investment in A or B is equal to the intermediary’s own 
investment in the activity (iA, iB) plus the funds raised from investors.  Constraint (13) says 29 
 
that the intermediary’s own investments cannot exceed his wealth wint; the constraints in Eq. 
(14) limit total investment and the supply of claims. 
By substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) into the objective function Eq. (10) and in the 
constraints in Eq. (14), we can rewrite the intermediary’s problem as 
 
B A i i a b , , , max   R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + E
Ly[(pA – 1)a+ iA] – iA –  iB + wint              (15) 
                 s.t.             iB + iA ≤ wint,                                                                         (16) 
– (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   – (pA – 1)a ≤ iA .                         (17) 
The objective function Eq. (15) shows that the intermediary is willing to issue a claim only if 
its price is higher than one.  In this case, the revenue generated by each unit of security issued 
is higher than the investment cost of creating the promised return. We assume 
 
A.4.  θ·yd < 1 and w >   ) 1 /( ) 1 ( int
*
d d y w y R w         .     
 
The first part of A.4 says that investors’ reservation price for the risky claim is less than one, 
which implies that in equilibrium pA < 1 and thus the risky claim is not issued (a = 0).  The 
second part of A.4 says that the investors’ wealth is sufficiently high that, even with 
innovation, the price of riskless claims is pB = θ·R.  This restriction, which is stronger than the 
one in A.2, simplifies the equilibrium analysis but can be relaxed.  Under A.4, the 
equilibrium at t = 0 is spelled out in Lemma 3.  
 
Lemma 3 In the absence of innovation, no risky claim is issued (a = 0) and  pA ≤ 1. The bond 
is issued for an amount b = 1 and pB = θ·R. The intermediary withdraws profits from the sale 
of b from activity B by setting iB = – (θ·R – 1). If  E
Ly ≥ 1, the intermediary invests these 
resources in A by setting iA = wint + θ·R – 1, and pA = 1. If  E
Ly < 1, the intermediary sets iA = 
0, consumes wint + θ·R – 1 before t = 2, and E
Ly ≤ pA < 1. 
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The main features of the pure exchange equilibrium of Lemma 1 also obtain in the 
production economy. There is a shortage of riskless bonds, and their entire supply is sold to 
investors at their reservation price. No risky claims are issued. The only difference from the 
pure exchange economy is that now the risky activity is only operated if its expected return is 
higher than the cost of investment (i.e., E
Ly ≥ 1). 
  
4.1 Innovation, equilibrium, and reaction to news  
As in Section 3, the intermediary creates new riskless claims by pledging the lowest 
possible output level generated by A. The maximum quantity of new claims that can be 
created in this way is equal to 
f 
LP = yd · IA/R.                                                           (18) 
The ability to create new claims increases in the amount of investment in activity A.  Taking 
this effect into account, with innovation the intermediary solves  
 
B A i i f b , , ,max  R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + (pBE
Ly – R)·f + E
Ly iA + wint – iB – iA      (19) 
                            s.t.        iB + iA ≤ wint ,                                                                  (20) 
     f ≤ f 
LP= iA [yd / (R – pB yd)],                                             (21) 
 – (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   0 ≤ iA.                                    (22)            
Constraint (21) directly follows from substituting into Eq. (18) the definition of investment IA 
= fpB + iA, where we have once more imposed pB = pN.  One important implication of Eq. (21) 
is that new claims can be issued only if the intermediary invests some of his wealth in A by 
setting iA > 0.  This is due to assumption A.4, which implies that yd is sufficiently small that 
the intermediary must ensure investors against the bad state by committing some of its wealth 
to the project.  We also assume 
 
A.5.  θ·E
Ly > 1. 
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A.5 implies that, to maximize objective Eq. (19) at pB = θ·R, the intermediary always wants to 
issue the maximum possible volume of new bonds f 
LP because the price the intermediary 
obtains for these bonds is higher than the ratio between the promised return R and A’s 
average return E
Ly.  We then have Proposition 3.  
 
Proposition 3 Under A.4 and A.5, there are two possible equilibrium configurations. 
(1) If E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd < 1, innovation does not occur and the equilibrium described in 
Lemma 3 arises. 
(2) If E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1, innovation occurs. The price of riskless claims is pB = θ·R, 
the intermediary sets IB = b = 1 and iB = – (θ·R – 1). This allows the intermediary to set iA = 
wint + θ·R – 1 and to sell the new security in volume f 
LP = [wint + θ·R – 1] [yd / R (1 – θ·yd)]. 
 
Compared with Proposition 1, here the cost of financial innovation arises 
endogenously when the physical return to capital in A is lower than the investment cost, i.e., 
E
Ly <1.  In this case, creating new securities requires the intermediary to invest in the risky 
technology, which entails a private cost.  If, however, the unit profit (θ – 1) ·yd obtained by 
the intermediary from each new riskless claim is large enough to more than compensate for 
the cost [formally, if E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1], then innovation takes place.  Through this effect 
financial innovation can be a source of investment inefficiencies because at t = 0 the 
intermediary could decide to invest in A and sell new claims even when he would not invest 
absent the possibility of financial innovation. 
  The second message of Proposition 3 is that when the creation of new claims requires 
investment, an intermediary’s desire to create new claims introduces a strong force for it to 
commit all of his initial wealth and income to investment so as to expand the volume of 
innovation.  As a consequence, when at t = 1 bad news arrives, the intermediary does not 32 
 
have spare wealth to buy any of the new claims back.  The result below formally shows the 
consequences of this logic. 
 
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium with innovation of Proposition 3, after the arrival of a bad 
signal s = s at t = 1, the price of the traditional bond stays constant at pB1 = θ·R, while the 
price of the new claim drops to pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R  and new claims are not traded at t = 1. 
 
The key difference from the result obtained in the pure exchange economy is that now 
the equilibrium price of the new claim drops to investors’ valuation regardless of whether the 
intermediary’s reservation price  R
L    for the same claim is higher than θ·(yr/yd)·R.  
Intermediaries have no spare wealth to buy back the new claims at t = 1 because they have 
optimally invested the totality of their t = 0 resources to boost the volume of innovation.   As 
a consequence, the local thinker’s neglect of the possibility of a recession leads to substantial 
price drops even when intermediaries barely react to news.  The idea that intermediaries tie 
up their capital in innovation, and have no spare liquidity in a crisis, is also present in Shleifer 
and Vishny (2010).   In that model, intermediaries had to coinvest with outsiders to keep 
some skin in the game.  Here the mechanism is different: Profit-maximizing intermediaries 
need to commit their capital at t = 0 to provide insurance to investors, but doing so deprives 
them of liquidity in a crisis.   
This analysis reinforces the message of the exchange model with respect to the role 
played by the shifting demand for new securities in generating financial fragility.  The 
issuance glut fostered by investors’ demand for riskless claims creates the room for severe 
price drops not only by inducing investors to recognize the claim as risky upon the arrival of 
bad news, but also by reducing the liquidity of intermediaries and thus their ability to support 
the new claim’s price.  The initial boost in the issuance of the new securities and their ex post 
price decline are just two sides of the same coin.  33 
 
5. Welfare analysis  
Section 2 showed that under rational expectations financial innovation is socially 
beneficial. It boosts intermediaries’ profits while leaving investors’ welfare unchanged.
8  
With local thinking, the welfare analysis is more complex.  From the viewpoint of agents’ 
beliefs at t  = 0, financial innovation is beneficial, just as under rational expectations. 
However, because agents’ initial beliefs are incorrect, this welfare level is illusory because it 
does not account for the riskiness of new claims.  Behavioral economists have long stressed 
that this tension between reality and incorrect beliefs raises important conceptual issues for 
defining a normative welfare metric.  We do not aim to resolve these issues in this section.  
Instead we consider how the false substitute effect created by financial innovation 
affects the average payoff realized by market participants, computed using the true 
distribution of states (and signals) as of t = 0.  For brevity, we focus on the most interesting 
case, where  ) / ( d r
L y y    .  We also assume that in the exchange economy the new claim 
receives its maximal price pB  =  θ·R at t = 0, which facilitates the comparison between 
exchange and production, as in the latter case it is also true that pB = θ·R. 
 
5.1. Welfare in the pure exchange model   
Without financial innovation, the average welfare of investors as of t = 0 is trivially 
equal to E(U) =  w, while that of intermediaries to E(Π) = θ·R + E(y), where U and Π denote 
the utility of the investor and intermediary, respectively.  To gauge the effect of financial 
innovation, suppose for a moment that there is no trading at t = 1.  Then the expected welfare 
of investors as of t = 0 is equal to E(Uinn) = w – θ·(yd – yr), and that of intermediaries is equal 
to E(Πinn) = θ·R (1 + f 
L) + E(y) – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr.  Relative to the no innovation case, 
                                                 
8 In the model of Section 2, intermediaries obtain the full benefit of innovation because assumption A.2 ensures 
that investors buy the new claim at their reservation price. If A.2 does not hold, the price of the new claim drops 
below θ·R, investors also benefit from innovation, and the creation of the new claim makes everybody better off. 34 
 
investors lose because they bear the risk of a recession and intermediaries gain because they 
sell more overpriced safe claims at t = 0.  The possibility of trading at t = 1 allows investors 
to undo at least in part their original portfolio and thus to cut their losses under innovation.  
 
Lemma 4 With financial innovation, if σ = 0, investors lose θ·(yd – yr) and intermediaries 
gain θ·yd – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr relative to the no innovation case.  If, instead, σ = 1, investors 
lose Pr(s )θ·(yd – yr) + Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd and intermediaries gain Pr(s ){θ·yd –[πg(s )+πd(s )]yd 
– πr(s )yr}+ Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd  relative to the no innovation case. 
  
Innovation benefits the intermediary by allowing it to sell more claims while it hurts 
investors by enabling them to buy a claim that is more risky than they think.  If intermediaries 
do not carry wealth to t = 1, then given that  ) / ( d r
L y y    , the loss to investors is larger 
than intermediaries’ gain because investors inefficiently bear risk in equilibrium.
9  If in 
contrast intermediaries carry wealth to t = 1, there is a net loss from innovation after s  but 
there is no net loss after s.  By buying back the new claims, intermediaries allow investors to 
increase current consumption, preventing them from bearing any future risk.  
  This analysis illustrates that, besides creating market fragility, false substitutability 
adds a countervailing cost to the standard market completing benefit of financial innovation. 
Here the cost of innovation always dominates its benefits due to investors’ infinite risk 
aversion, but with more moderate preferences the net effect would be ambiguous. 
 
5.2. Welfare in the model with production   
One key change in the production model is that because the intermediary does not 
carry any wealth to t = 1, there is no trading at t = 1.  With innovation, the welfare of 
                                                 
9This follows from the fact that (πg+ πd)yd + πryr > θ·yr if, and only if, (πg+ πd) + πr( yr/yd) > θ·( yr/yd), which 
always holds if 
L  > θ·( yr/yd) because (πg+ πd) + πr( yr/yd) > [πg(s)+πd(s)] + πr(s)( yr/yd) > 
L  > θ·( yr/yd).    35 
 
investors as of t = 0 is equal to E(Uinn) = w – θ·R· f 
LP [1 – (yr/yd)], where f 
LP= [wint + θ·R – 1] 
[yd  /  R (1 – θ·yd)] is the volume of innovation occurring with production.  Because the 
intermediary invests all of its wealth in A, it carries no wealth to t = 1.  As a consequence, in 
the spirit of Lemma 4, investors lose f 
LPθ·R [1 – (yr/yd)] from innovation.  
Consider now the intermediary’s welfare in the production model.  Now innovation 
and local thinking could induce the intermediary to undertake unprofitable investments.  
  
Proposition 5 When E
Ly +(θ–1)yd >1, the intermediary innovates and two cases arise: 
(1) If E
Ly < 1, the intermediary gains in the case of innovation if, and only if, 
E(y) + {θ – [(πg+πd) + πr(yr/yd)]} ·yd  > 1.                             (23) 
(2) If E
Ly ≥ 1, the intermediary gains in the case of innovation if, and only if, 
θ E(y) >  [(πg+πd) + πr(yr/yd)].                                      (24) 
 
In the model with production, both investors and intermediaries might lose from 
financial innovation.  As Eqs. (23) and (24) illustrate, intermediaries could lose from 
innovation when the true expected return from activity A is sufficiently low that 
manufacturing new claims is not profitable to begin with (not even by taking into account the 
fact that these claims do not repay in full in a recession).  Formally, this means that E(y) must 
be sufficiently lower than one.  In this case, optimism about the profitability of the new claim 
at t = 0 encourages the intermediary to overinvest in an unproductive activity, eventually 
triggering a loss.  The most interesting case occurs when E
Ly < 1.  Now the return to A is 
perceived to be sufficiently low that investment in A occurs only if new securities can be 
engineered, so financial innovation bears sole responsibility for unproductive investment.     
The expansion in the supply of housing in the decade prior to 2007 might have been an 
example of such inefficient investment needed to meet the growing demand for securitization 
of mortgages (Mian and Sufi, 2009; and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010).  36 
 
In sum, while under rational expectations financial innovation improves aggregate 
welfare by reducing the shortage of riskless claims, under local thinking it can reduce both 
investors’ and intermediaries’ welfare by distorting the allocation of both risk and 
investment.  
 
6. Rational intermediaries 
We have assumed so far that intermediaries and investors share the same incorrect 
beliefs.  We now show that the false substitutes effect holds even if the intermediaries hold 
rational expectations.  Rationality of the intermediaries introduces two changes into our 
previous setting.  First, the intermediaries evaluate returns correctly, which influences their 
investment and issuance decisions.  Second, intermediaries could try to profit from the 
possible drop in prices of the new securities by carrying some liquid wealth to t = 1.  This 
second effect (emphasized by Diamond and Rajan, 2010) could offset an intermediary’s 
incentive to commit its wealth to the risky project so as to expand the supply of new claims. 
When deciding at t = 0 what volume f of new securities to issue, what amount of own 
wealth iA to invest in A, and what amount of own wealth l to leave liquid for t = 1, a forward 
looking intermediary solves 
 
,, , max
AB bai i  R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + [pBEy – (1 – πr)R – πr(yr/yd)R]·f + Ey iA + 
+ wint – iB – iA + l·Pr(s)( 1 N
rational p R    )/ 1 N p                 (25) 
 
            s.t.                   iB + iA + l ≤ wint ,                                                              (26) 
     f ≤ iA [yd / (R – pB yd)],                                                     (27) 
 – (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   0 ≤ iA , 0 ≤ l                         (28)   
 
In the above program, 
rational   denotes the new claim’s repayment expected by the 
rational intermediary [formally,  ) / )( Pr( ) Pr( d r r d
rational y y s y s y y     ], which is always 37 
 
higher than the repayment expected by a local thinker [i.e., 
rational  >
L   for all  0  r  ].   The 
rational intermediary anticipates, in the second term of the objective function in Eq. (25), the 
possibility that in a recession the new claim pays only (yr/yd)R.  In addition, the last term in 
Eq. (25) illustrates that the intermediary expects to obtain a capital gain of 
( 1 N
rational p R    )/ 1 N p  by leaving some liquid wealth l for the event that the signal turns out 
to be low, which occurs with ex ante probability Pr(s).
10 
As in Section 4, under A.5 the intermediary issues, for a given amount of capital iA 
committed to A, the maximum possible amount of new claims at t = 0, implying that 
constraint (27) is binding.  Because the equilibrium price of riskless claims at t = 0 is still 
equal to pB = θ·R, the intermediary invests up to capacity in B and sets iB = – (θ·R – 1).  The 
new choice that the rational intermediary must make is whether to invest his wealth wint + θ·R 
– 1 into A so as to expand the supply of new claims at t = 0 or to store liquidity until t = 1 by 
setting  l > 0.  From objective (25) and constraint (27), it is easy to check that at the 
equilibrium price pB = θ·R the return the intermediary obtains from increasing iA is higher 
than that from increasing l, so that it is optimal for the intermediary to set l = 0, provided    
[θ Ey – (1 – πr) – πr(yr/yd)] 
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Even a rational intermediary invests all of its wealth in A when each unit invested in 
the risky project generates a sufficiently large upside (which the intermediary keeps for 
himself).  The return from investing $1 in A is multiplied by the factor  ) 1 /( 1 d y   , which 
                                                 
10 One implicit restriction in the above problem is that at t = 1 the intermediary cannot issue deposits to investors 
to buy the new claims. However, when the intermediary’s own liquidity at t = 1 is zero, the infinitely risk-averse 
investors are not willing to lend more that their own valuation of these claims, which undermines the 
intermediary’s ability to support the price of the new claim by borrowing ex post. 38 
 
captures the intermediary’s ability to profit by creating new claims from such investment, to 
realize a profit on them, to reinvest that profit in A to create more new claims, and so on. 
Condition (30) is hardest to satisfy when the probability that the new claim defaults is 
negligible (in the extreme when  1 
rational  ) and the price of the new claim at t = 1 is the 
lowest, when pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R.  In this case, the rational intermediary invests all of its wealth 
in A at t = 0, provided 
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which is satisfied for a broad range of parameter values.  If condition (31) does not hold, then 
the intermediary restricts the supply of new claims up to the point where the capital gain on 
the new claims is sufficiently small to use some but not all of his wealth to innovate and to 
transfer the rest to t = 1.  
 
7. Discussion 
We propose a new approach to modeling financial markets, one that emphasizes the 
central role of the neglect of low probability risks in accounting for the nature of financial 
innovation and financial fragility.  We motivate the model using several examples in which 
the neglect of risks appears important, including the recent financial crisis.  In conclusion, it 
might be useful to return to the crisis and to explain some of the ways in which our model 
offers a novel perspective on the events.  
We argue that both the sharp decline in home prices and the sensitivity of the prices of 
some AAA-rated MBS to home prices and mortgage defaults came as a substantial surprise to 
the market in the summer of 2007. The beginning of the financial crisis can be dated to July-
August 2007, when the markets first recognized these risks.  During this short period, Bear 
Stearns liquidated two hedge funds investing in mortgage-backed securities, the French bank 39 
 
BNP-Paribas halted redemptions in three investment funds supposedly investing in AAA-
rated assets, and the LIBOR-OIS (London Interbank Offered Rate – overnight indexed swap) 
spread exploded. Bad news from the housing market and increases in risk premia on the risky 
(as opposed to AAA) tranches on MBS all arrived months before, with no noticeable market 
disruptions.  It is only the realization that the debt which investors perceived to be completely 
safe was actually risky that created extreme fragility. 
The sudden realization that AAA-rated securities were risky contributed to the freeze 
of the asset based commercial paper (ABCP) market in the summer of 2007.  In our model, 
ABCP can be viewed as a loan collateralized by the senior tranch of the risky asset’s cash 
flow.  When this senior tranch is revealed to be more risky than originally thought, highly 
risk averse investors are no longer willing to hold the ABCP.  If the clientele for ABCP 
consists largely of such highly risk averse investors, prices and issuance volume would fall 
substantially as these investors withdraw from the market.    
We find it difficult to account for the crisis without incorporating the idea of a 
substantial surprise.  The leading alternative explanation of the events holds that financial 
institutions speculated in AAA-rated securities using short term finance such as repo because 
they counted on a government bailout (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter, 2010; and 
Gorton and Metrick, 2010).  The main argument in favor of this explanation is that banks and 
dealer banks themselves held enormous positions in these securities and sustained huge 
losses, leading to eventual bailouts.  Because we believe that the banks have themselves 
neglected the risks of AAA-rated MBS and CDOs, we do not find their large exposure to 
these securities, for inventory reasons, as skin in the game, or even as a speculative carry 
trade, to be inconsistent with our fundamental perspective.  We would also question the view 
that the banks were aware of the risks and were just gambling on a bailout.  After all, prior to 
the events of the summer of 2007, financial markets universally perceived AAA-rated MBS 40 
 
and CDOs to be safe, the banks’ credit default swaps traded as if banks were totally safe, and 
banks provided repo financing to hedge funds using MBS as collateral with very low 
haircuts.  We would argue that both the banks and the investors neglected the risks and were 
shocked by what happened – precisely the assumption we explore in this paper.  
An alternative view of the crisis sees it as a perfectly well considered but extremely 
rare event, a perfect storm.  Investors correctly assessed the extremely low probability of a 
crisis and priced securities accordingly, but this very low likelihood event nonetheless 
materialized.  This view is inconsistent with the evidence we cited earlier that investors used 
the wrong models, not correct models with low probability extreme events (Jarrow, Li, 
Mesler, and van Deventer, 2007; and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009).  It is also inconsistent 
with the evidence that financial crises in which investors accept too much risk without 
realizing that they are doing so are common.  We have already discussed the episodes with 
CMOs and money market funds in the Introduction. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) enumerate 
multiple recent episodes of banking panics originating in excessive risk taking and leverage.   
Greenwood and Hanson (2010) similarly show that periods of expanding leverage are 
accompanied by a deterioration in the quality of borrowers and are followed, on average, by 
negative returns on debt. The common thread in these studies is the neglect of risks, not the 
occurrence of low probability events.    
Our paper offers a distinct normative perspective on the recent financial crisis as well, 
which could bear on some emerging policy proposals. Several economists, including Gorton 
and Metrick (2010) and Stein (2010), recognize the creation of safe securities, particularly 
short term ones, as an important function of the shadow banking system.  In their view, the 
creation of such private money is in itself desirable but exposes the financial system to the 
risks of financial meltdown due to socially excessive leverage.  Desirable policies would thus 41 
 
seek to preserve the creation of liquidity by the banking system but control leverage or 
improve mechanisms of reducing leverage and unwinding security holdings in distress.   
  Our model is in agreement with the widely accepted prescription that greater capital 
and liquidity of financial intermediaries would lead to more stable markets (French et al., 
2010).  However, our model goes further by questioning the idea that all creation of private 
money by the banking system is necessarily desirable.  We recognize the benefits of private 
supply of safe securities but also note that, at least in some cases, such securities owe their 
very existence to neglected risks and have proved to be false substitutes for the traditional 
ones. False substitutes by themselves lead to financial instability and could reduce welfare, 
even without the effects of excessive leverage.   
The financial fragility discussed in our model would interact, perhaps dangerously, 
with leverage.  When investors or intermediaries perceive some securities to be safe, they 
would borrow using them as collateral, often with very low haircuts (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010; and Stein, 2010).  The realization that these securities are risky would lead to their 
sales by both investors and intermediaries trying to meet their collateral requirements, leading 
to additional fragility from fire sales.  The stronger is the ex ante belief that securities are 
safe, the higher is the borrowing against them, and the more extreme the fire sales.   Sales 
from unwinding levered positions and sales from disappointed expectations thus go in the 
same direction.  As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Stein (2010), depressed 
security prices can have especially adverse welfare consequences ex post because they cut off 
lending to new investment.   A financial crisis leads to an economic crisis.  We do not discuss 
these welfare issues here because they have been analyzed elsewhere. We only emphasize the 
reinforcing influence of leverage and misunderstood risks on fragility.      
If this perspective is correct, it suggests that recent policy proposals, while desirable 
in terms of their intent to control leverage and fire sales, do not go far enough.  It is not just 42 
 
the leverage, but the scale of financial innovation and of creation of new claims itself, that 
might require regulatory attention.  Such attention might be especially warranted when 
investors buy securities through an intermediary who makes either an explicit or an implicit 
guarantee backing them. Regulators could wish to require that intermediaries hold enough 
capital to make their guarantees credible or else refrain from making them.  This might be a 
particularly significant issue when the safety of either securities or intermediaries is illusory.  
  For example, the innovation of prime money market funds has arguably created much 
instability by giving investors the expectation of getting their money back on demand at par, 
even though it is invested in securities that are far from riskless.  Our model suggests that it 
might be better to help investors form more realistic expectations by mandating that these 
funds be marked to market.  With more realistic expectations of net asset value fluctuations, 
breaking the buck would no longer be a dramatic event that sparks a run on these funds and 
creates financial fragility.    
 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The proof is straightforward but illustrates the basic logic behind several of our 
results.  Given that Ey > θ·yd, there exists no price pA ≥ Ey at which intermediaries are willing 
to sell and investors are willing to buy.  As a consequence, pA = Ey and each intermediary is 
happy to hold its endowment of shares, i.e., a = 0.  If pB < θ·R, investors demand more than 
one unit of bonds [because by A.2 w/θR >1] and, provided pB ≥ R, intermediaries are willing 
to sell the full supply b = 1.  As a result, in equilibrium it must be that pB = θ·R so it is 
optimal for investors to buy exactly b = 1.   
 
Proof of Lemma 2  
The result directly follows from the proof of Lemma 1, with only two changes.  First, 
the supply of bonds is now equal to b = 1 + yr/R, but A.2 implies that investors can absorb all 
of it at their reservation price, so in equilibrium pB = θ·R.  Second, pA = Ey-yd and none of the 
risky claims is sold to investors (who value them zero). 43 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1  
The result directly follows from the proof of Lemma 1, with the only changes of 
replacing yr with yd.  Because the supply of bonds is now b = 1 + yd/R, if investors can absorb 
it at their reservation price, namely, if w/(θ·R) ≥ 1 + yd/R, in equilibrium pB = θ·R.  If this is 
not the case, i.e., if w < θ·(R + yd), then investors spend all of their wealth to purchase the 
bonds and pB = wR/(R+yd) > R. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
Consider the market’s reaction to a bad signal s.  To begin, note that the t = 1 
equilibrium must have pB1 = θ·R.  To see why, suppose that pB1 < θ·R (as we have seen, pB1 > 
θ·R is not an equilibrium because at that price investors sell their bonds but intermediaries are 
not willing to buy them).  At this price, investors want to purchase as many bonds as possible 
provided pN1 > (yr /yd) pB1.  This cannot be an equilibrium because investors’ demand for 
bonds does not encounter any supply.  Consider next the case in which pN1 ≤ (yr /yd) pB1. Now 
the new claim is priced below investors’ valuation pN1 < (yr /yd)θ·R.  This cannot, however, be 
an equilibrium because all investors demand the new claim (or some of the bond as well) but 
nobody supplies it.  As a result, it must be that pB1 = θ·R. 
Consider now the market for the new claim.  Given that pB1 = θ·R, if pN1 < (yr /yd)θ·R, 
then all investors would demand the new claim at t = 1, which cannot be an equilibrium 
because investors hold the total supply of it.  As a consequence, in equilibrium it must be that 
pN1 ≥ (yr /yd)θ·R. If pN1 = (yr /yd)θ·R, investors are indifferent between holding and selling the 
claim; if pN1 > (yr /yd)θ·R investors supply their total holdings f 
L.  If ω
L < (yr /yd)θ, the 
intermediary’s valuation of the new claim is lower than investors’ valuation.  As a result, the 
equilibrium price is equal to pN1 = (yr /yd)θ·R. If, instead, ω
L > (yr /yd)θ, intermediaries are 
willing to buy at least some of the claims from investors and the equilibrium price pN1 
depends on the share σ of t = 0 income carried by the intermediary to t = 1. 
The intermediary’s t = 0 income can take two values depending on whether the t = 0 
equilibrium falls in case (1) or (2) of Proposition 1.  Consider case (1), namely, θ·(R+yr) < w 
< θ·(R+yd).  The intermediary’s t = 0 income is equal to w.  The intermediary’s wealth at t = 1 
(and thus the demand for the new claim) is then equal to σ·w.  By equalizing supply and 
demand for the new claim, we can calculate that the equilibrium price is equal to 44 
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Together with A.2, Eq. (32) implies that  1() NB p p    = wR/(R+yd).   
Consider case (2), namely w > θ·(R+yd).  The intermediaries’ t = 0 income is equal to 
θ(R+yd). Now the intermediaries’ wealth at t = 1 is equal to σ·θ(R+yd).  By equalizing supply 
and demand for the new claim we can establish that the equilibrium price is now equal to 
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Thus,  1() NB p p    = θR. 
Consider next the comparative statics of the price drop (pB – pN1) with respect to yr and 
yd.  A higher yr increases pN1 both in cases (1) and (2), as one can readily see from Eqs. (32) 
and (33). A higher yr increases investors’ as well as intermediaries’ reservation price, 
boosting pN1.  Because pB does not depend on yr, this softens the price drop in both cases.  
Consider the role of yd.  It is easy to see that in Eqs. (32) and (33) a higher yd reduces pN1 by 
reducing both investors’ and intermediaries’ reservation prices.  Thus, in case (2), which 
prevails when yd < w/θ – R, a higher yd increases the price drop because here the initial price 
pB does not change with yd.  In case (1), in contrast, the initial price pB also falls in yd, 
potentially allowing the price drop (pB – pN1) to fall with yd.  Take the first derivative of (pB – 
pN1) with respect to yd in each of the three ranges of σ in Eq. (2).  After some algebra one can 
see that for each of these ranges there is a threshold  d y ˆ  such that (pB – pN1) increases in yd if 
and only if, yd <  d y ˆ .  Defining    R w y y d d    / , ˆ max
*   proves the proposition.        
 
Proof of Corollary 1  
Under rational expectations, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that 
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To consider local thinking, first note that in the absence of innovation 
) ( E z y R V
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z   θ , for z = 0, s,  s. This implies that  ) ( E ) 0 ( E 0 z y t y V V
L L L
z
L      for z 
= s,s. With innovation, consider first case (1) of Proposition 1, in which the initial price of 
riskless bonds and of new claims is pB = wR/(R+yd). Now  ) ( E
, z y y w V d
L L I
z     for z = 
0,s. If, instead, z = s, then      s y y y R V d
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Consider case (2) of Proposition 1. Now pB = θR and  ) ( E
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These inequalities prove Corollary 1. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3  
For investors to buy shares it must be that pA ≤ θ·yd. By A.4 this implies that investors 
buy shares only if pA < 1.  However, in objective (15) the intermediary issues shares only if 
pA ≥ 1.  As a consequence, in equilibrium the intermediary does not issue any shares and pA ≤ 
1.  Because in equilibrium pB =θR ≥ R, the intermediary issues the maximal amount b = 1 of 
bonds because these yield at least as much as the intermediary’s own investment iB in B at the 
same unit investment cost.  Thus, the intermediary withdraws from B the profits from bond 
sales by setting  iB =  – (θR – 1).  The intermediary then invests these resources along with his 
wealth wint in A if, and only if, E
Ly ≥ 1. When E
Ly ≥ 1 the equilibrium price of shares is pA = 1 
(if pA < 1 intermediaries would prefer to buy shares than to invest).  When E
Ly < 1 the 
equilibrium price of shares is E
Ly < pA < 1 (so that no investment occurs, no shares are issued, 
and no shares are demanded).   
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
Assume for now that pB =θR. (We later show that in equilibrium it must be so.)  This 
has two consequences.  First, under A.5 it follows from objective (19) that the intermediary 
issues the maximum volume of new claims so that Eq. (21) is binding.  Second, as in the 46 
 
proof of Lemma 3, the intermediary issues b = 1 bonds and sets iB =  – (θR – 1).  By 
substituting pB =θR and constraint (21) into the intermediary’s objective (19), we see that up 
to an additive constant the objective becomes 
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As a result, when E
Ly + (θ – 1)yd < 1, the intermediary sets iA = 0 and does not create any new 
claims. When instead E
Ly + (θ – 1)yd ≥ 1, the intermediary sets iA at its maximum wint+ (θR – 
1) and issues new claims for the volume implied by Eq. (21).  It is easy to check that given 
A.4 this volume is sufficiently low (relative to investors’ wealth w) that the equilibrium price 
for riskless bonds is effectively equal to pB =θR. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
The logic of the proof is identical to that of the proof of Proposition 2, except now the 
production structure pins down the intermediary’s wealth at t = 1 at σ = 0. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4  
If the intermediary carries no wealth at t = 1, namely, σ = 0, there is no trading at t = 
1.  Suppose instead that the intermediary carries all of his wealth at t = 1, namely, σ = 1. 
Then, after observing s there is no trading anyway, implying that E(Uinn|s) = w – θ·(yd – yr) 
and E(Πinn|s) = θ·R (1 + f 
L) + E(y) – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr.  After observing s, investors sell all 
the new claims at pN1= ω
L·R so that they now obtain E(Uinn|s) = w – (θ – ω
L)R·f 
L, while the 
welfare of intermediaries (who buy the claims at t = 1) is equal to E(Πinn|s) = θ·R (1 + f 
L) – 
ω
LR·f 
L + E(y).  If σ = 0 then, innovation allows intermediaries to gain θ·yd – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr 
and investors to lose θ·(yd – yr).  If, instead, σ = 1, then innovation allows intermediaries to 
gain on average Pr(s ){θ·yd –[πg(s )+πd(s )]yd – πr(s )yr}+ Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd and investors to 
lose Pr(s)θ·(yd – yr) + Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd if σ = 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5  
By Lemma 3, without innovation the intermediary obtains E(Π) = wint + θ·R  – 1 if 
E
Ly < 1 and E(Π) = E(y)·[wint + θ·R – 1] if E
Ly ≥ 1.  By Proposition 3, the intermediary 
innovates when E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1.  n the latter case, in the allocation of Proposition 3, the 
payoff obtained by the intermediary with innovation is on average equal to E(Πinn) = {E(y) – 47 
 
[(πg+πd) + πr(yr/yd)]yd }
d y
R w



  
1
1 int .  By comparing this expression with the previous two 
equations describing the intermediary’s welfare absent innovation, it is immediate to establish 
the conditions of Proposition 5.  
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